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NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff appeals from Orders of the Public Service
Commission of Utah (PSC or Commission) issued in PSCU Case No.
82-035-14 in which Utah Power & Light Company (Utah Power or
Company) was granted in effect a one-time increase in rates of
$6,012,000 to be collected from Utah ratepayers during future
period to partially make up for revenues received during the test
year of PSCU Case No. 81-035-13 ending September, 1982 which were
lower than revenues projected by the Company and included in
rates.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Upon application by Utah Power, a majority of the
Public Service Commission, by Order dated December 30, 1982,
granted the Company's request to remove $6.012,000 from the
Energy Balancing Account (EBA) of the Company, Account No.

191,

which absent the Commission's Order, would have been returned to
ratepayers in the form of an adjustment to the energy component
of Utah Power's rates.

The removal of $6.012,000 from the EBA

offset Company expenses in 1982 with the result of increasing
Company earnings for calendar year 1982 and requiring an increase
in future rates to make up for the adjustment.

On July 5, 1983,
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after rehearing, a majority of the Corrm1ssion affirmed its
original decision.

Pursuant to

§

54-6-16.

Utah Code Annotated

1953, plaintiff appeals directly to this Court.

RELIEF SOUGtiT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks a determination by the Court that the
Orders of the Public Service Commission issued in Case No.
82-035-14 are void and unlawful as a matter of law and requests

the Court to vacate said Orders with directions to the Public
Service Commission to return to the balance of the EBA the amount
removed by sa10 Orders in order to allow those funds to be
returned to ratepayers through the operation of the EBA
procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On October 8, 1982, Utah Power filed an application
with the Public Service Commission, Case No. 82-035-14, styled
"In the Matter of the Application of Utah Power & Light Company
to Implement the Company's Energy Balancing Account for the
Period Septerr.ber, 1981, through September, 1982."

The applica-

ti on requested the transfer of $6. 012, 000 from the then-existing

balance in the Company's EBA to the Company.
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Hearings were held on the application December 2, and
3, 1982.

At the hearing, two witnesses testified on behalf of

Utah Power.

Dean L. Bryner testified as to the Company's view of

purpose of the EBA pass-through procedure and the circumstances
relating to the Company's request for a transfer of dollars from
the EBA to the Company.

He testified that during the general

rate Case No. 81-035-13. which used a test-year period of 12
months ending Septerr.ber, 1982 for the purposes of projecting Utah
Jurisdictional revenues, expenses and investment as the basis of
determining future rates, the Company's actual Utah jurisdictional sales were $40,000,000 less than projected by the Company and
included by the Commission in the determination of rates.

The

reduction in jurisdictional sales created an unanticipated
opportunity to make additional shortterm excess energy sales
(termed by the Company surplus nontariff sales, which means sales
from assets allocated to serve Utah jurisdictional customers that
are made to non-jurisdictional customers or unexpected additional
sales from surplus to jurisdictional customers) of $18,054,000.
Mr. Bryner argued that the current energy pass-through
process, which off sets against energy expenses all nontarif f
sales revenues, created a "substantial windfall" to ratepayers at
the expense of the Company.

He argued that one-third of the

cidd1tiona1 revenue created by the loss of jurisdictional sales
should not be credited against energy costs but should be used to
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increase Company earnings.

Mr. Bryner testified that this

$6,012,000 adjustment should not affect Case No.

82-035-13, an

application by the Company for a general increase in rates to
customers using a test-year period of September, 1982 through
September, 1983 (and being considered by the Public Service
Commission concurrently with the request in this proceedins)
since the revenue shortfall was experienced only in the test year
related to Case No. 81-035-13 (Record 5-10).

Orrin T. Colby,

Jr.

reiterated Mr. Bryner's testimony and verified his calculations.
In addition, he testified with regard to the Company's financial
condition for the 12 months ended August, 1982.

He presented

figures for earnings per share, dividend payout ratio and return
on common equity for those periods on a total Company basis
(including business operations in Wyoming, Idaho and wholesale
operations regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).

Mr. Colby estimated Utah jurisdictional return on equity

to be about 13.25% stating that it was below the return on equity
authorized in Case No. 81-035-13 of 16.3%.

He testified that

~e

Company proposal would improve earnings per share and return on
common equity for the calendar year 1982.

(Record 47-57).

The Division of Public Utilities (Division or
Plaintiff) presented testimony through Dr. George Compton, that
based on current financial conditions and investors' expectations, the requested infusion of dollars with the result of
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improving the Company's financial condition was not necessary.
In addition, Dr. Compton objected to the proposal of the Company
because 1) it was retroactive in nature and 2) if the Commission
wished to reduce risk, borne by shareholders of the Company, that
jurisdictional revenues received will be less than and approved
by the Commission that the Commission must also look at the other
side of the coin; that is, reduce the risk borne by ratepayers
that jurisdictional revenues received by the Company will be
higher than those approved by the Commission.

Dr. Compton

suggested the consideration by the Commission of prospective
modification of the energy pass-through procedure to consider
both issues.

(Record 101-126).

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the
Division of Public Utilities verbally moved the Commission to
dismiss the application.

The Division argued that 1) the

Company's request was being improperly considered as an energy
cost pass-through pursuant to§ 54-7-12(3) (d), Utah Code Ann.
1981 Amend.); 2) the request was in contravention of the rule
prohibiting retroactive ratemaking; and, 3) because the request
was not an energy cost pass-through such a rate increase could
not be granted without a determination that rates were just and
reasonable based on evidence with regard to basic ratemaking
components and that such evidence was not presented.
mission failed to rule on the Division's Motion.

The Com-
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On December 30, 1982, the

Com~ission

granting the application of Utah Power.
findings,

issued its Order

The Commission, in its

recited the evidence presented by Utah Power including

earnings per share, dividend payout ratio, and return on equity
for the 12 months ended August, 1982, found that the Company harl
been authorized a return in equity by the Public Service Comm1ssion in Case No. 81-035-13 of 16.3% and concluded that "the
adjustment proposed by the Company was just and reasonable and
should be allowed".

However, the Commission also concluded that

any future adjustments of this kind must be Frospective in
nature.
The Order was silent as to the evidence presented by
the plaintiff that current financial conditions and market
expectations did not require the infusion of earnings requested
by the Company.

The Order was also silent as to the legal

arguments raised in the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.

Commis-

sioner Bryne dissented, objectins to the retroactive nature of
the Company's request stating "this Commission shoul6 not engage
in retroactively assisting the Company when earnings are low or
in retroactively punishing the Company when earnings are high".
The Order of the Public Service Commission is attached hereto as
Appendix 1.
Because the Order was issued in the closing days of
1982, the transfer of dollars was made by Utah Power with the
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effect that the Company's financial condition was improved for
calendar year 1982.
On January 19, 1983, within the time provided by law,
plaintiff filed with the Commission its Petition for a Rehearing
and Reconsideration pursuant to the requirements of
f,tah

Code Annotated (1981 amendment).

§

54-7-15,

The Committee of Consumer

Services also filed with the Commission a Motion for Rehearing
and Reconsideration.

By Order dated April 20, 1983, the

Commission granted the Motion for Rehearing of the Division and
the Committee.
1983.

Hearing was held the 24th and 25th days of May,

At the hearing, further testimony as presented by Mr.

Bryner, which further explained the Company's views as to the
purpcse and function of the EBA.

Hr. Colby also testified as to

the financial effect on the Company should the Commission's Order
be reversed on rehearing.
By Order dated July 5, 1983, the Commission reaffirmed
its original decision in the proceeding.

The majority of the

Commission concluded that 1) the adjustment to the EBA approved
by the Commission in this proceeding was "consistent" with other
adJustments previously and currently made and did not alter the
Commission-approved rate. 2) the "adjustment" was within the
01

·tl1ority of the Commission, 3) it was consistent with the

Commission's intent that the EBA "eliminate

ineq~itable

results

or windfall benefits to either the Company or its ratepayers"
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and, 4) the "adjustment" was not retroactive ratemaking.
Commissioner Byrne again dissented.
attached hereto as Appendix 2.

The Order on Rehearing is

Thereafter, on August 3, 1983,

plaintiff petitioned this Court for Writ of Certiorari pursuant
to the requirements of

§

54-7-16. Utah Code Annotated 1953.

Concurrent with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari,
plaintiff requested of this Court a stay or suspension of the
Public Service Commission's decision pending the outcome of this
appeal.

After oral argument by Plaintiff and intervenor Utah

Power, the plaintiff's Motion was denied, by a Minute Entry oatec
August 15, 1983.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCT 101'
In order to understand the nature of this appeal end
the effect of the Public Service Commission decision in the
proceeding before the Court, an understanding of the Public
Utility regulatory process in the state of Utah is essential.
Plaintiff intends, therefore, to as simply and briefly as
possible describe the means available to the Public Service
Commission to adjust utility rates within the authority delegatec
to the Public Service Commission by the Legislature as set forth
in Title 54 Utah Code Ann.
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After

.Ml.inn

v.

Illinois , 94 u.s. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77

(1877), where the United States Supreme Court upheld an Illinois
statute fixing maximum rates for the storage of grain by public
warehousemen saying that such regulation was "for the public
good", there had been a search for general standards in setting
of fair rates for regulated industries.

~

v.

~

, 169

ll.S. 466 18 s.ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819 (1898), was an early attempt
lo develop such standards.

There, the Court held that the basis

for all calculations as to reasonableness of rates must be the
"fair value" of the property used in serving the public.

This

was later called the "rate base".
Building on

~

, Justice Brandeis in his now

universally followed concurring opinion in
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

v.

Missouri ex rel

~

, 262 U.S. 276,

43 s.ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 981 (1923), articulated the standard for
"just and reasonable" rates:
To decide whether a proposed rate
is confiscatory, the tribunal must determine
both what sum would be earned under it, and
whether that sum would be a fair return. The
decision involves ordinarily the making of
four subsidiaries one:
1) What the gross earnings from operating a
utility under the rate in controversy would
be (a prediction).
2) What the operating expenses and charges
while so operating would be (a prediction).
3) The rate base, that is what the amount is
on which a return should be earned.
(Under
iS..my_th v.
~
an opinion, largely.)
4) What rate of return should be deemed
fair.
(An opinion, largely.)
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262 U.S. at 291.
Subsequently, numerous cases have attempted to better
define the basic requirements mentioned by Brandeis.
example,

~

v.

See, for

Hope Natural G,;is ComJ;?any , 320 U.S. 591, 6;

s.ct. 2Bl, BB L.Ed. 333 (1944), discussing proper rate base
determination and
Company

v.

~

Bluefield Water Works. and ImJ;?royement
, 262 U.S. 679, 43 s.ct. 675 and 67 L.Ed. 476

(1923) discussing "fair rate of return".
Over the years. a well-defined standard for the
determination of "just and reasonable" rates has solidified.
This standard is applicable in the state of Utah

(§

54-3-1 Utah

Code Ann. 1977 Amend.), and the procedure developed to assist in
the determination of "just and reasonable" rates is also used in
the State of Utah.

This procedure was described by this Court ir

Utah Department of Business Regulation Division of Public
Utilities
citing

v.

Public Service Comroissi.Qn , 614 P.2d 1242 (19BO),

City of Los Angeles

v.

Public Utilities Commission ,

497 P.2d 7B5, 797 (1972):
In City of Los Anaeles v. ~
Utilities Commission , the Court pointed out
that the basic approach in ratemaking is to
take a test year and determine the revenues.
expenses. in investment for the test year
period. Test year results are adjusted to
allow for reasonably-anticipated changes in
revenues. expenses. or other conditions in
order that the test period results of operations will be as nearly representative of
future conditions as possible. The Commission may adjust all figures, revenue,
expense. and investment for anticipated

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
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changes, but it may not adjust one side or
part of the equation without adjusting the
other ••
In determining a just and reasonable rate, the gross revenue should be of a
sum to cover two distinct components, the
operating expense and the return on invested
capital. The return (the profit) is calculated solely on the rate base (the capital
contributed by the investors); a utility is
not entitled to earn an additional profit on
its expenses but only to recover those costs
on a dollar-for-dollar basis. In a general
rate proceeding, the Commission determines
for a test period the expenses. the rate
base, and the rate of return to be allowed.
Based on those figures, the Commission determines the revenue requirements, then fixes a
rate to produce sufficient income to meet the
revenue requirements.
This formula is used only to determine rates
prospectively in effect.

Section 54-4-4(1) Utah Code Ann.

(1953) gives the Public Service Commission authority to
"determine just, reasonable or sufficient rates, ••
to be thereafter observed and in force".
In implementing this prohibition against retroactive
ratemaking, the Commission looks to the future, using a future
test year pursuant to§ 54-4-4(3)

(Utah Code Ann. 1975 Amend.),

on the premise that, particularly in inflationary t!.mes. the
future test period more accurately reflects conditions faced by
the

Company during the time the rates would be in effect.

The

Commission ignores occurrences prior to the test year whatever
lhey may have been.

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
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In order to arrive at rates which are just and
reasonable using the rate-making procedure described, it is
essential that all elements of revenue derived from utility
assets, as well as expenses incurred in providing utility service
be considered.

However, because rates are always set prospect-

ively, there exists the pcssiblity that actual revenues, expenses
and investment may be different than expected. There exists a
risk for both ratepayers and the utility. The Company takes the
risk that earnings will be less than intended by the Public
Service Commission (until an adjustment can be made) and ratepayers take the risk that Company earnings may be better than
authorized (until an adjustment can be made).

This risk rela-

tionship helps promote cost effective and productive operations
of utilties since any productivity gains directly affect earnings, and has been generally accepted in utility regulation.
(A more complete discussion of this principle follows in Point
III herein.)
During the time of the energy crisis of the early '70s,
it became apparent that existing regulatory practices were not
adequate to deal with volatile, unpredictable expenses such as
fuel costs.

Because fuel costs are typically a substantial

pcrtion of a utility's expense, rapid unforseen increases in such
costs had devastating effects on utility earnings.

Legislators

responded by implementing statutory methods of allowing rapid

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
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adjustments in rates to pass these increased costs along to
customers.

These methods. often known generically as "fuel

adjustment clauses", took many different forms but were typically
limited to a dollar-to-dollar pass-through of fuel costs incurred
by the utility.

In Otah, H.B. 227 was introduced in the Legislature in
1975, which resulted in an amendment to§ 54-7-12(1) Utah Code
Ann. (1953).

Prior to the amendment. subsection (1) provided:

No public utility shall raise any
rate • • • under any circumstances whatever,
except upon a showing before the commission
and a finding by the commission that such
increase is justified.
After 1975, subsection (1) read:
No public utility shall raise any
rate, fare, toll, rental, or charge or so
alter any classification, contract. practice,
rule or regulation as to result in an
increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental or
charge under any circumstances whatsoever
except in the case of fuel cost increases to
the utility by an independent contractor or
other independent source of supply and then
only upon a showing before the commission and
a finding by the commission that such
increase is justified.
Prior to 1975, the only procedure set forth in the
statutes for obtaining a rate increase was that in 54-7-12(2),
Utah Code Ann. (1953), designed to accommodate a general rate
case proceeding.

After 1975, with the amendment of§ 54-7-12(1),

the opportunity existed for a more responsive action by the

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
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Commission related to utility fuel costs from an independent
source ot supply.
The exception to general rate case treatment was
narrowly defined by the Legislature.

While the Legislature

wished the regulatory process to be flexible enough to be
responsive to volatile and unpredictable costs. there was the
expression of concern about the misuse of the amendment by
utilities attempting to raise company profits and concern that
the amendment would result in the reduction of incentives to be
efficient and cost-effective in operations.

Therefore. the

Legislature limited the so-called "pass-through statute" to a
pass-through of fuel cost increases from independent sources of
supply with a finding by the Commission that the increase is
"Justified".

Tapes of House of Representatives Floor Debate,

H.B. 227, Feb. 12, 14, 1975.
The pass-through statute was amended in 1976 and again
in 1981 in order to better define expenses which qualified for
pass-through treatment and to streamline the pass-through procedure.

§

54-7-12(3) (d), Utah Code Ann.

(1981 Amend.) now reads:

If a public utility files a
proposed rate increase based on an increase
cost to the utility for fuel or energy purchased or obtained from independent contractors, other independent suppliers. or any
supplier whose prices are regulated by a
governmental agency, the commission shall
issue a tentative order with respect to such
proposed increase within ten days after the
proposal is filed unless it issues a final
order with respect to such rate increases in
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20 days after the proposal was filed. A public hearing shall be held by the commission
within 30 days after issuance of such
tentative order to determine if the proposed
rate increase is just and reasonable.
In a pass-through proceeding only evidence related to
energy costs is considered and a Commission finding that a rate
increase is just and reasonable only relates to the energy cost
component of the rates collected from customers. since only
energy costs are considered.
The vehicle developed for the purpose of

i~plementing

the Legislature's intent with regard to the pass through of
energy related costs for both gas and electric utilities has been
the Energy Balancing Account.

The Energy Balancing Account (EBA)

was instituted by the Commission for Utah Power & Light in Case
Nos. 78-035-21 and 79-035-03 in a general rate Order issued July
20, 1979, and the pertinent portions of which are attached hereto
as Appendix 3.
In the context of Utah Power not only fuel costs.
(coal) were unpredictable but also the cost of purchased energy
and non-tariff revenues.

It was because these energy related

costs and revenues could not be adequately projected in general
rate cases that the EBA was instituted.

The Commission found:

The commission notes that Utah
Power is in a unique position to acquire and
use or sell inexpensive hydropower from the
northwest as well as sell at a profit power
generated with its own surplus capacity to
oil-burning electric utilities in the southwest. Because of fluctuations and the avail-
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bility of hydropower. however, there can be
wide variations in the revenue available from
the sales of such power and the amount of
fuel costs saved when such power is used to
offset internal generation.
Because of these wide variations.
the appropriate treatment of expense and
revenue attributable to purchase power sales
for resale and fuel costs is of considerable
concern to the commission. During the course
of these proceedings. the division presented
testimony on appropriate amounts to be allo~
ed for purchase power and sales for resale
which differ significantly from figures
proposed by the company. Given that these
items have not been susceptible to accurate
estimation, we conclude that the division's
figures are as much a guess as Utah Power's.
Therefore. we have declined to adjust the
revenue requirement found herein by the
amounts proposed by the division as well as
those adjustments proposed by Utah Power as
they relate to sales for resale and energy
costs.
The commission concludes that it
would be reasonable and in the public interest for Utah Power to establish an energybalancing account which is designed to track
the actual annual costs and revenues attributable to these items making estimates
thereof unnecessary in future cases.
Order page 14, paragraphs 31-33.
The EBA is an account which is intended to keep track
of over or under collections in net energy costs.

If in previous

periods the energy component of rates to customers has been
insufficient to cover all net energy costs, there will be a
balance in the EBA in favor of Utah Power which indicates that
they have not recovered all of their energy costs.

Conversely,
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if the energy component of the rate actually overcollects net
energy costs, there will be a balance in favor of ratepayers
which must be returned to ratepayers in the future in the form
of a reduced energy cost component of rates.
Utah Power's rates to customers are made up of a nonenergy component-items considered in a general rate case, and an
energy component-items related to net energy costs.

The energy

component is adjusted in energy balancing account pass-through
proceedings.
In determining the appropriate energy component, the
Commission will approve projections as to energy expenses for a
future period, which costs include projections as to the cost and
amount of coal to be used in Utah Power generating facilities and
the cost of purchased power projected to be used by the Company.
Offset against these costs are projections of non-tariff
revenues.

The third element is the current balance in the EBA,

whether in favor of ratepayers or in favor of the Company.

An energy component of the rate is calculated which
will, during the future period measured, recover for the Company
actual net energy-related costs and also bring the EBA balance
to zero.

For example, if in past periods the Company has over

r_·ollected in rates for its net energy expenses, there would be a
balance in favor of ratepayers in the EBA.

For a future period,

the Company would calculate the amount necessary to be collected

CASE NOS. 19361,

Page 18

19362

in rates from customers for future net energy costs and calculate
an energy component of rates necessary to recover those costs.
That rate is then reduced to offset the EBA balance in ratepayers' favor over time.

If the calculated energy component of the

rate which would collect energy costs and "zero out" the balancing account is different than the energy component currently
included in rates, the Commission, by Order in a pass-through
proceeding, will modify the energy component.

The result is th ct

over the long term Utah Power will collect only actual energyrelated expenses.
In summary, the energy cost pass-through procedure
removes from the utility company a very important risk - the
undercollection of net energy related expenses.

It also removes

an opportunity for over-recovery of net energy costs.

Eowever,

the energy cost pass-through procedure does not insulate the
Company from risks of reduced earnings related to misprojections
of other components of the ratemaking process.
The pass-through proceeding, which considers the
elements of the energy component of rates, may or may not result
in a change in the energy component of the rate since even wide
fluctuations of the expense or revenue elements may be off set by
changes in other elements.

However, modifications of the

elements which make up the energy component of the rate will
ultimately have an impact on the energy component of the rate and
on revenue collected from ratepayers.

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
Page 19

A second exception to general rate case procedure
exists.

That exception was described by this Court in

De~artment

v.

~

ll.t..ah

of Business Regulation. Division of Public Utilities
614 P.2d 1242 (1980) as an "offset" proceeding.

An

offset proceeding is intended to provide prompt rate adjustment
for unusual changes in expenses other than energy costs.

h~ile

the Court intended to allow for abbreviated proceedings related
to items of expense outside of energy-related costs, the offset
proceeding shares the same limititation as the pass-through
energy cost statute, namely that it allows from the pass-through
cf a particular extraordinary expense, and is not a vehicle for
the consideration of "just and reasonable" rates including a
fair rate of return.

No utility to date has filed an application

for a rate increase based on the Court's delineation of a
"offset" proceeding for extraordinary expenses other than energy
costs.
Plaintiff asserts that the Public Services Commission
decision at issue allows Utah Power to further modify the
existing risk relationship between the Company and ratepayers,
using the energy cost pass-through procedure to shift to the
ratepayers risk associated with misprojection of elements of
rates other than the energy related expenses and revenues.

This

action is an unwarranted and unlawful misuse of the energy cost
pass-through procedure and has the effect of a future increase in
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rates to insure company earnings for past periods,

resulting in

the Public Service Commission essentially guaranteeing the
company a minimum level of earnings. and thereby removing
incentives to be cost effective and efficient in utility
operation,

in violation of existing regulatory policy and law.

POINT I
COMMISSION'S ORDER IN THIS PROCEEDING RESULTED
IN A ONE-TIME INCREASE IN RATES 'l'O THE CUSTOMERS
OF UTAH POWER OF $6,012,000
Section 54-7-12(1) Utah Code Ann.

(1981 Amend.) defines

rate increase as "any direct increase in a rate, fare,
rental or other charge of a public utility

toll,

or any modification

of a classification. contract. practice. ruJe or a regulation
that increases a rate. fare.
public utility" •

toll.

rental or other charge of a

(Emphasis added.)

The language of this sec-

tion, which prefaces the procedures required in the consideration
by the Commission of a rate increase,
all-inclusive.

is obviously intended to

~

Whether a rate increase occurs as the result of a

direct modification of the Company's tariff on file with the
Commission, or whether it results in a modification of any
practice,

rule,

regulation, contract or classification which has

the effect of increasing rates,

the procedural requirements of

the applicable portion of § 54-7-12 apply.
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The result of the Commission's Order transferring
$6,012,000 from the EBA to the Company for the purpose of

increasing Company return in 1982 is that the Company has been
granted a one-time rate increase of $6,012,000.
Any adjustment to any element of the Energy Balancing
Account or other components of the pass-through procedure
inevitably results in a modification of rates and revenue
collected by the Company.

The fact that there is uncertainty as

to when the rate increase will occur does not detract from the
certainty of the rate increase, itself.
Although the energy component of the rates charged to
Utah ratepayers was not modified by the Commission's Order in
this case, the rate increase nonetheless was granted.

The energy

component of the rate remains the same until the energy related
expenses and revenues in total require a modification and that
modification is adopted by the Commission.

The sir.1ple effect of

the Commission's Order in this proceeding is that by renoving
from the current balance of the EBA $6,012,000, which would have
been returned to ratepayers in the future, rates during the
future will be higher in order to allow the Company to retain the
$6,012,000.

This fact was conceded by Utah Power Witness

Bryner:
Question: The results of the $6.000,000
taken out of the balancing account, you
testified previously, will result in the
surcharge for energy costs being raised, is
that correct?
In order to collect in the
future an additional $6,010,000?

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
Page 22

Answer:
occur.
Question:

Some time in the future that will
Do you know when in the future?

Answer:
No, not until there has to be an
increase.
Question: But at some point 6,000,000
additional dollars will have to be recovered
from ratepayers because of that $6,000,000
adjustment, is that correct?
Answer:

It--had it not been removed. yes.

Commissioner Byrne:
It may be a reduction
foregone rather than an increase required.
no?
The Witness:

That's correct.

Question:
(By Mr. Rich)
It is an additional
$6,000,000 that must be recovered somehow
whether in less of a reduction or increase?
Answer:

A dollar is a dollar.

(Record 220-221.)
The $6,Ul2,000 increase granted by the Public Service
Commission is currently being collected from Utah ratepayers.

In

Case No. 8J-u35-u4, by Order issued July 1, 1983 (after the Order
issued in this case but prior to the Order on Rehearing issued
July 5, 1983), the PSC reduced the energy component of Utah Power
rates.

This reduction was based on evidence presented that due

to large amounts of cheap hydropower available in the Northwest,
revenue expections from non-tariff rates and a reduction in cost
of coal from company owned mines. that by October 1, 1983 the EBA
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would have a balance in ratepayers' favor of $10,371,000.

The

Commission reduced the energy component of the rate by an amount
which was intended to reduce the EBA balance to zero by October 31, 1983.

If the Company request at issue in this proceeding

had not been granted, the balance in the EBA in favor of
ratepayers would have been $6,012,000 higher and the reduction in
rates ordered by the Public Service Commission in order to
meet the goal of "zeroing out" the EBA by October 31, 1983 would
have been larger.

The Public Service Comrr.ission Order in that

proceeding is attached hereto as Appendix 4.
The defendant cannot claim that this Order does not
constitute a rate increase.

There is only one source for utility

revenues; that is utility ratepayers.

There is only one way of

increasing revenues collected from ratepayers and that is through
an increase in rates.

The fact that this increase is indirect

and the result of a complicated balancing account procedure makes
it no less a rate increase wherein the appropriate statutory
requirements apply.
POINT I I
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY
TO GRANT A UTILITY A RATE INCREASE WHICH INCREASES
COMPANY RETURN THROUGH THE USE
OF THE ENERGY COST PASS-THROUGH PROCEDURE
As discussed previously, the Energy Balancing Account
is the vehicle used by the Commission to pass through to rate-
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payers net energy costs of Utah Power pursuant to the authority
delegated to the Commission in
(1981 Amend.).

§

54-7-12 (3) (d). Utah Code Ann.

The Commission's Order in this case (character-

izea by both Utah Power

~~j

the Commission as an energy cost

pass-through) provides to Utah Power the opportunity, outside m
the consideration of the justness and reasonableness of its
rates, to be granted a rate increase which increases its earnings.
of

This is entirely inconsistent with the language and intEr..

§ 54-7-12

(3) (d), Utah Code Ann.

(1981 Amend.).

As discussed

previously, the Legislature. in originally fashioning the
opportunity for pass-through treatment for energy costs, was
concerned about misuse by utilities of such pass-throughs with
the effect of increasing Company earnings or reducing the
tive to provide cost-effective service.

The Legislature designE:

limic:,c;_cns fas discussed at pages 13, 14,
of

~reventing

ince~

~

) • as a means

or minimizing these concerns.

The Legislature's concerns in 19 /5 appear to be wellfounded.

This Court has already had occasion to strike down an

attempt by Mountain Fuel Supply Company to expand the passthrough provision to include pass-through of non-energy related
expenses, i.e., wage increases.

The Department of Business

Regulation. Division of Public Utilit~
1242 (Ut. 1980).

v.

.I:.._S._L_ ,

614 p,2d

Utah Power and Light's attempt to broaden the

pass-through statue~ is much more far-reaching.
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Utah Power has not attempted to pass through non-energy
to ratepayers.

2xr~n5Ps

t"couqh" at all.

The Company's request is not a "pass-

The Company seeks no less than to increase

tuture rates to make up for past "under-collections".

The only

tuol available to that purpose is the energy cost pass-through
statute. since in a general rate proceeding (such as Case No.
82-0~J0-13

where. based on test year ending September 1983, the

Public Service Commission granted Utah Power a rate increase on
an interim basis of $49,000,000 November 8, 1982) the Public
Service Commission must ignore past occurrences.

The Company,

therefore, attempted to re-shape the energy cost pass-through
procedure to accomplish this end.
The unambiguous language of
Ann.

(1981 Amend.), cited

~lll..a,

§

54-7-12 (3) (d). Utah Code

together with the intent of

the Legisltuare as described in the House of Representatives'
floor debate and the determination of the Court in
B.11~~~ulation
~onclusion

v.

I:!Jblic Service

Co~i.M

D..epartment of
, compel the

that the decision of the Public Service Commission in

lhis proceeding is an unlawful misuse of the pass-through
statute.

'v

THE COMMISSION ACTION IN THIS PROCEEDING
IOLATES THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING
The State of Utah has adopted by statute the rule
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prohibiting retroactive ratemaking.
Ann.

Section 54-4-4(1) Utah CodE

( 1981 Supp.) states in part:
• the Commission shall
determine the just, reasonable or sufficient
rates. fares. tolls. rentals. charges,
classifications, rules, regulations,
practices or contracts .t.lL...bL.t~tiil.
observed and in force and shall fix the same
by order as hereinafter provided.
(Emphasis
added.)!

This rule against retroactive ratemaking is based on one of the
primary purposes of public utility regulation. i.e., encouraging,
in the absence of competition, efficient and cost-effective
operations resulting in reasonable utility rates.

As stated by

the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in

Electric

.C..Onw.filll'.

v.

~

.llil~~

, 415 A.2d 177 (1980):

The rule against retroactive ratemaking serves two basic functions.
Initially, it protects the public by assuring that
present customers will not be required to pay
for past deficits for the company in their
future payments. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has expressed this legitimate concern
as follows:
The present practice as set forth
in these cases is fair to the public utility
for it can act as speedily as it sees fit to
move in the direction of inadequate rates and
it is fair to the consumer in safeguarding
him from surprise surcharges dating back over
years that he had a right to assume were
finished business for him and possibly over
years when he was not even a consumer.
N.e~
J~rsey Power and Light...J:..QmpQ.lU'
v • .s...taU;
Department of Public Utilities. Board..Qf.
Public Commissione.I..S. , 15 N.J. 82, 93, 104,
A. 2d 1,7 (1954). See lie~ Oklahoma Gas
AD~l Company
v.
~ , 113 Ok. 126,
239 P.588 (1925).

CASE NOS. 19361, 19362
Page 27

The rule also prevents the company
from employing future rates as a means of
assuring the investments of its stockholders.
G_.eorgia Railway anQJ.Q~Q.lllil.fillY v. Rail::
r~lDJllli.si.QJ:LQ~r;si.ll , 278 F.242
(D.C. Geo. 1922). If the utility's income
were guaranteed. the company would lose all
incentive to operate in an efficient costeffective manner, thereby leading to higher
operating costs and eventual rate increases.
415. A.2d at 178, 179.
The general policy reasons for the rule against retroactive ratemaking were further elaborated by Justice Clark in his
dissent from

.S..O~n

California Edison Comparuc

v.

~

Utilities Commiss:l.Qn , 576 P. 2d 945 (Cal. 1978):
The rule against retroactive
ratemaking places upon the utility the risk
that in fixing the rate the commission erred
in estimating expenses and revenues. If the
estimated revenues were too high or the
estimated costs too low, the utility will
bear the loss and fail to recover the projected rate of return. On the other hand.
if estimated revenues are lower than those
that actually occurred or the estimated costs
higher than actual costs, the utility will
benefit. Because so many circumstances exist
significantly effecting the expense and
revenue, it is to be anticipated that estimated costs and revenues were rarely if ever
equal actual ones and the utility will realize more or less than the predicted rate
of return.
Tne rule against retroactive ratemaking serves to encourage efficiency because
the utility will strive to hold down costs so
as to increase profits under the established
rate. Permitting retroactive ratemaking
would shift the risk of error in estimating
costs and revenues from the utility to the
consumer reducing the utility's incentive for
efficiency.
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576 P.2d at 958.
The Courts have routinely enforced the rule against
retroactive ratemaking for tre protection of utilities [see for
example,

Arizona

~~QlllllfillY

v.

At~n_,_jj)peka

and Santi

Fe Railway CQlllllfilly , 284 U.S. 370 (U.S. S.Ct. 1931)]. as well as
for utility ratepayers.
However. the rule against retroactive ratemaking has
typically not been applied to fuel adjustment clauses.

As dis-

cussed previously, the purpose of fuel adjustment clauses is to
remove energy related costs from the typical ratemaking proceeding and fashion a more responsive and more accurate method of
allowing the utility to recover such expenses.

Often, such

methods result in over or under-collection of energy related
costs.
Courts have been unwilling to utilize the rule against
retroactive ratemaking to allow utilities to be enriched when a
fuel adjustment clause resulted in over-collections of energy
related costs.
Maryland

v.

For example, in

Public Service

D..elmarva Power and Light Company

Co~~f

of_ll~rul

, 400

A.2d 1147 (Special Court of Appeals 1979). the Company's fuel
rate adjustment clause had allowed the Company to collect in
rates more than the cost of fuel.

The Commission ordered a

refund and the Company objected claiming, in part, that a refund
would constitute retroactive ratemaking.

The Court stated:
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All the parties to this case agree
that retroactive ratemaking is impermissible
but we think the controversy in this case is
to be distinguished from the Commission's
function in approving rates to be charged in
a base rate hearing proceeding.
As we have indicated. the theory of
permitting the filing of FRA [fuel rate
adjustment] clauses with the Public Service
Commission is to permit a more rapid recognition and recovery of fluctuating fuel costs
without the requirement of lengthy and
complex hearings. As these FRA clauses
contemplate complex formulas which must be
tested against mathematical calculations from
designated figures each month, we conclude
that implicitly, the Commission must retain
jurisdiction over such charges in order to
assure that the charges made are fair and
reasonable to the customer as well as to the
company • • • • If as determined by the Commission Delmarva did miscalculate its fuel
rate and as a result of the miscalculation
dia receive $400.000 in excess charges, then
to suggest that the Commission had no power
to order a refund as to these particular
charges would make Section 27 (a) (2) [which
prohibits collection of compensation
different from specified in tariffs on file
with the Commission] completely unenforceable
and nugatory. We do not mean by this
conclusion to suggest even remotely that the
Commission is empowered to engage in
retroactive ratemaking but we distinguish
between the ordinary ratemaking process and
the necessarily ongoing process of verifying
and adjusting fuel rate adjustment clauses so
that they accurately reflect the increased
and decreased costs (we hope) of the fuel
necessary to operate a utility plant.
40U

A.2d at 1153.
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This exception from the rule against retroactive
ratemaking for energy adjustment

claus~s

is necessary in order

t

prevent a utility from misusing the energy adjustment clause.
Like Utah Power in this case, some utilities have attempted to
use energy adjustment clauses as a means of attempting to
guarantee that they actually earn their authorized rate of
return.
U~ilities

In

Southern California Edison Company

v.

.£.u~

Commission of Caljforni.a. , 576 P.2d 945 (Cal. 1978),

the California Commission instituted an automatic fuel adjustment
clause in 19/2 which allowed Edison to prepare a forecast of the
quantity of fossil fuel it would need to purchase during a 12month future period and calculate the cost of such fuel at
current prices and adjust its rates based on these predictions.
However- by the end of 1974, Edison bad collected 408 Million
Dollars for fuel expenses but had actually spent only $262.2
Million Dollars, leaving the Company holding 145.8 Million
Do1lars more than it needed to offset increased fuel costs.
While Eaison described the adjustment as a "miniature rate
proceeding intended to generate whatever higher rates were deemed
necessary to prevent 'decay· in the utility's overall rate of
return on invested capital", 576 P.2d 948, the Commission
disagreed and 1) instituted a monthly balancing account in order
to balance future over or under-collections in fuel costs and. 21
ordered a refund of the 145 Million Dollar over-collection in
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rates to customers over a three-year period.

On appeal, the

utility argued that the refund Order constituted retroactive
ratemaking.
The California Supreme Court made a distinction between
typical ratemaking proceedings and "narrowly restricted and
semi-automatic functioning ot an adjustment clause" which it
Ieferred to as "substantially ministerial".

576 P.2d 953.

The

Court concluded that because the operation of the adjustment
clause was not "ratemaking". the rule against retroactive ratemaking did not apply.
In the case before this Court, Utah Power, like
Southern California Edison, has attempted to use the energy
balancing account pass-through procedure as a method of
preventing "decay" in its overall rate of return.

The Company

presented testimony indicating that there was an foreseen drop in
revenues during the year ending September, 1982 causing an
overall earned rate of return less than authorized by the Public
Service Commission.

The Commission's decision, issued just prior

to the end of 1982, allowed the Company a Six Million Dollar
earning boost that increased the Company's total company return
on equity for calendar year 1982 by almost one half of one per
'cnt (Record 249).

As previously discussed. approximately Six

Million Dollars more revenue will be collected from Utah
Jurisdictional ratepayers in the future by operation of the EBA
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procedure as a result of the Commission's decrease in this
proceeding.
The Commission's decision in this proceeding in essenCE
allows the exception to the rule against retroactive ratemaking
for pass-through of energy costs to be expanded to such an exten•
that it "eats up" the general rule.

Permitting utilities to use

the energy ba1ancing account pass-through mechanism as a

means~

improving past earnings by increasing future rates is in contravention of the policy reasons behind the rule against retroactive
ratemaking

The risk that actual conditions will vary from

predictions in the rate case would no longer (as has always been
the case in the past) borne by the Company but now would be borne
by utility ratepayers with the effect of guaranteeing a level of
return for Utah Power and reducing the traditional regulation
imosed incentive to provide cost effective and efficient
operations.

POINT

I~

COMMISSION'S ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS
THAT THE INCREASE IN RATES IS JUST AND REASONABLE,
AND THERE IS NO COMPETENT OR SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING.
The Court states in

I\eCJJJ.l.Ati.Qn
that:

v.

,f,ublic Service

llt~2artment

Co~i.Qn

of Business

, 614 P.2d at 1245
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The first prerequisite of a rate order
is that it be preceded by a hearing and
findings. At such a hearing, the Legislature
intended that there be evidence introduced
that could reasonably be calculated to
resolve the issue presented for
determination, which is this case is a rate
increase. The findings required by statute
(of a just and reasonable rate §54-7-12(2))
must be made in accordance with the evidence
so presented. If there be no substantial
evidence to support an essential finding,
that finding cannot stand. and a rate order
predicated upon it must fall.
Because, as discussed previous herein, Utah Power's
request in this proceeding was neither for an "offset" of
unusual expenses or a pass-through of energy costs, the
applicable standards of evidence and required findings related
to such proceedings are not applicable.

Therefore. the finding

of a "just and reasonable rate" (of §54-7-12(2) Utah Code Ann.
(1981 Amendment)) must be made and must be in accordance with
the evidence presented.

In this proceeding, the Commission's

Order did not find that the rate increase granted was just and
reasonable.

Nor was there evidence upon which such a finding

could have been based.

Therefore. the Commission's Order must

In the Commission's December 30th order, it concluded
only that "the proposed adjustment of the company is just and
reasonable and should be allowed".

(Appendix 1, Order p. 4.)

There was no finding or conclusion that the rates resulting
from the Commission's Order were just and reasonable, nor could

CASE NOS • 19 3 61, 19 3 6 2
Page 34

there be.

Utah Power and the Commission both considered this

proceeding as if it were an energy-cost pass through proceedir.,
and dia not present or consider evidence necessary in the
determination of just and reasonable rates.

The evidence

necessary for such a finding, described previously herein and
discussed in

Utah

.£]Jblic Service

De~artment

Comm~iQn

o~~

Regulation

v•

, requires the choosing of a future

"test year", a projection of revenues, expenses, and "rate
base" for that test year, and a determination of the
appropriate return on investment during that period.
The evidence presented by Utah Power in support of
its request did not meet this standard of evidence.

No evi-

dence was presented by Utah Power with regard to jurisdictiona:
expenses or investment for any period of time.

The company die

present evidence that revenues for the twelve months ending
August, 1982, were lower than projected by the company and
included by the Commission in rates in Case no. 81-035-13.
Record 7-8.

No evidence was presented with regard to Utah

jurisdictional revenues for any future period.

Evidence

relating to company actual return on equity was presented with
regard to the twelve months ending August of 1982 for both
total company and Utah jurisdiction.

No evidence was presentec

by the company with regard to earnings current at the time of
the hearing, or of projections of return for any future period
or as to the appropriate level of return which would currently
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be required.

The only evidence relating to the current finan-

cial condition of the company was presented by Division witness
Compton, who testified that the financial condition of the
company and investor expectations as reflected by the stock
price did not require an additional $6,012,000 in return.
Record at 104, 105.

This testimony, although uncontroverted,

was ignored by the Commission.
In the Commission's Order, there were no findings as
to rate base or expenses for any period.

There was a finding

that for the twelve months ending August, 1982, revenues were
less than projected in Case No. 81-035-13. (Appendix 1, Order
page 2).
The Commission also found that Utah jurisdictional
return on equity for the twelve months ending August, 1982, was
13.25%, and that the company was allowed a return on equity of
16.3% in case No. 81-035-13.

(Id., page 3)

It was apparently

in reliance on this fact that the company during 1982 had not
earned a return on equity equal to that authorized in Case No.
81-u35-13 that the Commission concluded the retro-active
"adjustment" proposed by the company was was "just and
reasonable".

Such reliance on a prior determination of

reasonable rate of return has been characterized by this Court
as an "abuse of authority".
U~~Qlic

In

ll.t~ate

Board of

Re~-'h

Service Cornmi.s.si.Qn, 583 P.2d 609 (Utah. 1978), the

issue was the appropriateness of using prior determinations in
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Caiculating rate of return.

The Court concluded that in the

determination of just and reasonable rates. the Commission mus'.
make a determination as to the financial conditions
existing.

.t.h.e.n

The Court states:
Such a course necessitates the taking of
evidence after which the Commisison may well
conclude that circumstances remain unchanged
since the prior Order. However, to totally
ignore the possibility of significant changes
of circumstances or to assume there has been
none, must be viewed as error. 583 P.2d at
611.
Because the Commission chose to rely on past

determinations as to appropriate rate or return, and because
there was not substantial evidence presented in which there
could be a determination made as to the other basic rate

maki~

components for the Utah jurisdiction of Utah Power & Light,
namely Utah jurisdiction revenues, expenses and rate base,
there was no "evidence introduced that could reasonably be
caiculated to resolve the issue presented for determination,
which is in this case a rate increase".
B~siness

at 1245.

Resulation

v.

Public Service

Utah Department oi
Co~~

, 614 P.2d

In other words, there was not substantial evidence in

the record upon which a finding that the rate increase granted
in this case is just and reasonableMoreover. the Commission's conclusion that the
"adjustment" proposed by the company is just and reasonable
does not constitute a finding that rates are just and
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reasonable.

Because ot the deficiencies of the evidence

presented, reliance of prior determinations, and lack of a
finding that the rate increase granted in the case was just and
reasonable, the Commission's decision herein is arbitrary and
capricious, and must be vacated by this Court •

.cQNCLUS ION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Public
Service Commission in the case before the Court must be set
aside and vacated, with directions to return $6,012,000 to the
ba1ance, in favor of ratepayers. of the EBA, thereby allowing
that amount to return to the ratepayers.
The decision represents an attempt to re-shape
regulatory law and policy, altering the role of regulation and
the relationships between utilities and ratepayers.

Such

matters are the province, not of the Public Service Commission.
but of the Legislature.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11th day of October,
1983.

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Department of
Business Regulation
Division of Public Utilities
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